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TORTS
OVERVIEW
Although substantive tort law is developed almost exclusively by the
state courts, the federal courts must regularly apply this law in cases
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) I and under diversity
jurisdiction. 2 In light of the variety of tort cases considered by the
Tenth Circuit each year and the rapid developments in tort law, this sur-
vey, for ihe first time, includes an article covering the more significant
tort cases.
The article is divided into two major sections. First, it reviews cases
brought under the FTCA. This section covers cases that address a fail-
ure to warn claim arising from an inoculation administered pursuant to
the Swine Flu Act, the discretionary function exception to the waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FTCA, and the physical manifestation
limitation on negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
The second section of the article addresses tort issues that arose in
diversity jurisdiction cases. Some of the tort areas covered in the second
section include the intentional injury exception to the exclusivity of
workmen's compensation relief, assumption of risk as a defense in prod-
ucts liability cases, and allowing the jury in a products liability case to
consider the ordinary negligence of a non-party employer. The article
concludes by briefly considering the Tenth Circuit's failure to ground
consistently its affirmance of punitive damages in products liability cases
on a thorough review of the record.
Recognizing that a federal court is not the proper forum for signifi-
cant developments in substantive tort law, this article, for the most part,
focuses upon background information and analysis, without much atten-
tion to the decisions' affect upon substantive law.
I. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT
A. Swine Flu Products Liability Litigation
Fearing an outbreak of a new strain of influenza that appeared to be
similar to a strain of influenza that killed over 450,000 people in the
United States during the pandemic of 1918-19, Congress passed the Na-
tional Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 (Swine Flu Act).3 Pur-
l. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982).
2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) the law of the place where the alleged
negligent conduct or omission occurred must be applied in a suit brought under the
FTCA. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). In diversity cases federal courts must
apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the claim arose. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976) (amended 1978). The provisions of
this Act were originally codified in the Public Health Services Act, § 317, 42 U.S.C. § 247b
(j)-(1). However, Congress, when it passed the Health Services and Centers Amendments
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suant to the Swine Flu Act, the federal government attempted to
inoculate the entire adult population of the United States against swine
flu. Approximately forty million people were inoculated during the im-
munization program. 4 The Swine Flu Act relieved the vaccine manufac-
turers of liability and created an exclusive remedy against the United
States for any injuries resulting from the immunization program. 5
Unthank v. United States 6 was one of the many cases which arose out
of the swine flu immunization program of 1976. 7 Verlin Unthank con-
tracted transverse myelitis, a serious neurological disorder, after receiv-
ing her swine flu vaccination. 8 Unthank brought suit against the United
States under the FTCA seeking recovery under the theories of failure to
warn, negligence, and strict liability.9 The trial court found that Mrs.
Unthank's swine flu inoculation directly and proximately caused her
transverse myelitis and that it was predictable at the time of the inocula-
tion that this malady could result from the inoculation.' 0 The trial
court, however, rejected the plaintiff's theories of recovery."l It stated
that the consent form used by the government, warning of the possibil-
ity of a severe or fatal reaction to the vaccine, was sufficient to allow Mrs.
Unthank to make an informed decision as to whether she should be vac-
cinated.' 2 The court concluded that any additional warning regarding
the vaccine's potential for causing neurological disorders would not
have made the plaintiffs consent any more informed.
13
The trial court held that the government was not liable for any inad-
equacy in the consent form. 14 The trial court also held that Mrs. Un-
thank had failed to prove that her transverse myelitis was proximately
caused by the negligence of the federal government or of a program
participant 15 but, nevertheless, imposed liability without fault on the
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626, § 202, 92 Stat. 3574, eliminated the statutory provisions
dealing with the establishment, operation, and civil liability of the swine flu program.
4. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 703, 716-17
(D. Utah 1982), afd sub noma. Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984), in
which Judge Finesilver summarizes the history of the Swine Flu Act. He notes that the
cases of Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), and Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), which held man-
ufacturers of polio vaccine liable for failing to warn of the vaccine's inherent dangers,
significantly broadened liability in favor of consumers. 533 F. Supp. at 716-17 n.20. Due
to this broadening of liability, the government needed to provide protection for pharma-
ceutical manufacturers in order to obtain their cooperation and participation in the swine
flu program. Id. at 716-17.
5. In re Swine Flu Immunization, 533 F. Supp. at 717.
6. 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984).
7. As of 1980, over 150 lawsuits had been filed in the judicial districts within the
Tenth Circuit. Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 n.7 (D. Colo. 1980).
8. 732 F.2d at 1518. For a detailed discussion of the facts and medical history of the
plaintiff see In re Swine Flu Immunization, 533 F. Supp. at 706-07.
9. In re Swine Flu Immunization, 533 F. Supp. at 705.
10. Id. at 713-14; see also 732 F.2d at 1518.
11. 533 F. Supp. at 714-16.
12. In administering the Swine Flu Act the government had each participant sign a
standardized consent form. See infra note 22.
13. 533 F. Supp. at 715-16.
14. Id. at 719.




The only issue on appeal was the basis for liability.' 7 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the government's policy of
conceding liability where an inoculation caused Landry-Guillian Barre
Syndrome (GBS) applied in this case.' 8 The Tenth Circuit, however,
was not content with simply affirming the trial court; it also found the
government liable under the theories of negligent failure to warn and
strict liability.' 9 The Tenth Circuit, in reviewing the district court's find-
ings of fact, determined that the consent form signed by the plaintiff did
not adequately apprise her of the dangers of the swine flu vaccine.
20
The Tenth Circuit concluded that, based on the barrage of publicity the
government used to convince people the swine flue vaccine was both
safe and necessary, "it would be a travesty to suggest that people who
hurriedly signed the standardized form presented to them were ade-
quately informed of the risks."'2 ' The court held that the general lan-
guage of the consent form warning of a "possibility of severe or
potentially fatal reaction[s]" was not "informed" for the purposes of the
act.
2 2
The Tenth Circuit did not, however, adequately address the basis
for the trial court's rejection of the informed consent theory of liability:
inclusion of the neurological disorders that could result from the vac-
cine on the form would not have materially added to the knowledge im-
parted by the warning. 23 The Tenth Circuit suggested the consent form
should have provided participants with information on the risk of no
16. Id. at 719. Liability without fault, or absolute liability, is significantly different
from strict products liability. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182
N.W.2d 800 (1970). Where liability without fault is imposed, an actor is liable for harm to
the person or property of another resulting from the activity in which he is engaging irre-
spective of his degree of care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965). In strict
products liability, a plaintiff must not only establish that the harm flowed from the use of a
product but also that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Judge Finesilver decided that liability without fault was appropriate in this case for two
reasons. First, the federal government had adopted a policy whereby persons contracting
Landry-Guillian Barre Syndrome (GBS)-the most common demyelinating disease of the
peripheral nervous system-did not need to prove negligence on the part of those ad-
ministering the Swine Flu Program. The claimants had to show only that GBS developed
as a result of the Swine Flu vaccination. Judge Finesilver determined that transverse my-
elitis fell within the broad categories of maladies labeled GBS. 533 F. Supp. at 718-19,
721-22. Second, he determined that the legislative history of the Swine Flu Act favored
the imposition of liability without fault when the plaintiff contracted a malady that was
predictable at the time of the inoculation. 533 F. Supp. at 706.
17. 732 F.2d at 1519.
18. d. at 1520.
19. Id. at 1523.
20. Id. at 1520-21.
21. Id. at 1521.
22. Id. at 1521-22. The consent form, under a section entitled Special Precautions,
provided that -[a]s with any vaccine or drug, the possibility of severe or potentially fatal
reactions exists. However, flu vaccine has rarely been associated with severe or fatal reac-
tions." 533 F. Supp. at 715. See also Young v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (providing the entire text of the consent form the government used in this
program).
23. See 732 F.2d at 1521.
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treatment at all. The decision seems to indicate that the government's
use of publicity aimed at overcoming citizens' resistance to participating
in this program negated the possibility that almost any standardized
consent form would be sufficient to inform those receiving shots of the
risks involved. 24 The court also held that liability could be imposed in
this case on a theory of strict products liability. 25 The court reasoned
that since the plaintiff was inadequately warned of the vaccine's dangers,
the vaccine was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Adequacy of a
warning, however, is a question of fact to be decided by a trial court-
not an appellate court.
2 6
The Tenth Circuit's decision regarding the adequacy of the warning
is unique. Other federal appellate courts that have, addressed this issue
have uniformly limited their holdings to a discussion of the proper stan-
dards under which to evaluate the warning.2 7 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, determined that the evidence in the case, coupled with the
decisions of several federal district courts, compelled a finding that the
warnings given were inadequate. 28 The court seems to have engaged in
appellate fact finding by reweighing the evidence presented and drawing
its own inferences.
B. The Discretionary Function Exception
Congress, in sweeping language, waived the federal government's
sovereign immunity from tort claims by passing the FTCA. 29 This
broad waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is limited by the discre-
tionary function exception.30 While the boundaries of this exception
24. See id.
25. Id. at 1522-23.
26. See Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 1981).
27. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 704 F.2d 587 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming trial
court's determination that the consent form met the requirements of Alabama law); Petty
v. United States, 679 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing and remandingbecause trial
court applied wrong standard).
28. 732 F.2d at 1520-2 1. The Tenth Circuit indicated that -it was relying on the deci-
sions in Hasler v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,
718 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ci. 84 (1984); Von Michalofshi v. United
States, No. C 78-568R (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 1983); and Petty v. United -States, 536 F.
Supp. 860 (N.D. Iowa 1980), rev d, 679 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1982), as the basis for conclud-
ing the evidence in this case required a finding that the warnings were inadequate. 732
F.2d at 1521 n. 1. The Tenth Circuit did not explain why the findings.of fact in these cases
required a finding that the warnings were inadequate when other federal district courts
have found that the warnings were adequate. See, e.g., Marneef v. United States, 533 F.
Supp. 129 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Warner v. United States,522 F. Supp. 87 (M.D. Fla. 1981);
Bean v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 567 (D. Colo 1980).
29. See supra note 1. United States v. Yellow Cab Cc.,' 340 U.S. 543,547 (1951); Miller
v. United States, 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352.(1983).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). This section provides that the government cannot be
held liable for:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the -Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a




are not clearly defined, if a government official is not relying upon a
fixed or readily ascertainable standard in performing his statutory du-
ties, his decision is within the ambit of the discretionary function excep-
tion.3 1 If, on the other hand, he is relying upon a "fixed or readily
ascertainable standard," his decision is not within the ambit of the ex-
ception.3 2 Thus, the discretionary function exception presents a signifi-
cant obstacle to practically any plaintiff bringing a tort action against the
United States government. This exception "poses a jurisdictonal pre-
requisite to suit, which the plaintiff must ultimately meet as part of his
overall burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction."
'33
In Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States,3 4 the plaintiff sought
damages and indemnification under the FTCA for its losses arising from
a mid-air collision of two small aircraft. 3 5 The plaintiff's aircraft was at-
tempting to make an instruments-only landing under the guidance of a
Stapleton airtraffic controller when it collided with another aircraft. 36
The plaintiff alleged that one of the causes of the collision was the de-
sign of the terminal control area (TCA) created by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for Stapleton Airport.
3 7
The Denver TCA can be envisioned as an inverted wedding cake
consisting of three vertical cylinders, each at a different altitude and
each having its center at Stapleton.3 8 TCAs are intended to reduce the
danger of mid-air collisions by restricting the airspace near an airport to
controlled aircraft.3 9 The other aircraft involved in the collision was not
controlled by, or even in communication with, the Stapleton airtraffic
controllers. 40 The collision occurred when the plaintiff's aircraft passed
from the middle cylinder to the lower cylinder, temporarily leaving the
TCA.4 1 The plaintiffs' theory was that the FAA was negligent in design-
ing the TCA in a manner that allowed controlled aircraft to leave the
protection of the TCA while making an instruments-only landing.4 2
Although the district court found the FAA negligent in designing
the Denver TCA, because FAA failed to provide a buffer zone between
31. Burton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979). The United States
Supreme Court has noted that it is unnecessary and even impossible to define with preci-
sion every contour of the discretionary function exception. See United States v. S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2765 (1984); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953).
32. Burton v. United States, 609 F.2d at 979.
33. Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1144 (1982).
34. 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 872.
36. Id. at 893.
37. Id. at 874-75 n.9.
38. For a diagram of the Denver TCA see Colorado Flying Academy, 724 F.2d at 881.
39. 724 F.2d at 873-74.
40. Id. at 873.
41. Id. at 874.
42. 724 F.2d at 875. See also id. at 881 (diagram). The plaintiff also alleged that the
radar controller was negligent on several grounds. See id. at 874-75 n.9.
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controlled and uncontrolled aircraft,4 3 the district court denied relief
because it found that the action was within the discretionery function
exception and not a primary cause of the accident. In affirming this de-
cision, the court of appeals reasoned that competing aviation interests
were weighed and policy decisions were made in determining the design
of Denver's TCA; therefore, the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA prevented the government from being liable for the design of the
TCA.
4 4
The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case is supported by the recent
Supreme Court decision of United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense.45 There the Court held that the discretionary function excep-
tion precludes a tort action based on the conduct of the FAA in certify-
ing aircraft for use in commercial aviation. 4 6 The Court stated:
[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function excep-
tion applies in a given case.
[W]hatever else the discretionary function exception may
include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary
acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals.
4 7
The Court also noted that "[t]he FAA has a statutory duty to promote
safety in air transportation, not to insure it."
' 4 8
The rationale and holding of this Supreme Court decision supports
the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Colorado Flying Academy. 4 9 The FAA, in
designing the TCA, was regulating conduct and, therefore, cannot be
held liable for any negligence associated with this activity. In fashioning
this exception, Congress took "steps to protect the Government from
liability that would seriously handicap efficient government opera-
tions." 50 The Tenth Circuit properly concluded that the acts of the FAA
43. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (D.
Colo. 1981).
44. 724 F.2d at 876-77 (citing Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 665-66 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352 (1983); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370,
375-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977)).
45. 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
46. Id. at 2769.
47. Id. at 2765 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 2769 (emphasis deleted).
49. The Tenth Circuit's opinion is also in line with decisions in other jurisdictions
which have found the actions of the Federal Aviation Administration to be within the dis-
cretionary function exception. See, e.g., Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061 (6th
Cir. 1981) (setting standards for aircraft safety or crashworthiness is an activity squarely
within the discretionary function exception); Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982) (decision on how detailed sectional aeronauti-
cal charts should be for flight information falls within the discretionary function excep-
tion); Rulli v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1502 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (decisions as to the scope
of the FAA's regulation of navigational aids fall squarely within the discretionary function
exception); Miller v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Ky. 1974), aJ'd, 522 F.2d 386
(6th Cir. 1975) (due to the discretionary function exception, the government cannot be
held liable for failing to promulgate rules deemed necessary by a private litigant).
50. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
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in designing the TCA fell within this exception. 5 1
The court in Colorado Flying Academy relied on the recent Tenth Cir-
cuit opinion in Miller v. United States.5 2 In Miller, the plaintiffs were driv-
ing along Interstate 70 in Colorado when their vehicle skidded off the
slippery roadway and down a steep embankment, causing severe inju-
ries. 53 They brought an action against the United States under the
FTCA and the Federal Highway Safety Act,5 4 alleging that the govern-
ment had negligently approved the design of the highway and negli-
gently failed to require warnings of the dangers posed by the design.
5 5
The district court, without providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to
conduct discovery, granted the government's motion to dismiss based
on the discretionary function exception. 5 6 The court of appeals af-
firmed this decision.5 7 In analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the Tenth Cir-
cuit first reviewed the Federal Aid Highway Act 58 and the Federal
Highway Safety Act. 59 The court found that the Secretary of Transpor-
tation had considerable discretion in reviewing and approving highway
designs and establishing safety measures for the nation's highways.
60
The court, therefore, concluded that the discretionary function excep-
tion prevented the plaintiffs from maintaining the suit.
6 1
In reaching this decision, the court relied on its decision in Wright v.
United States6 2 where it held that the discretionary function exception
barred a suit against the United States based on alleged negligence of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the design, placement, construction, in-
spection, and management of a bridge and its approach roads. 63 The
court, while noting that Wright was distinguishable, found it persuasive
as to the scope of the discretionary function exception regarding federal
activities relating to road building and maintenance. 64 The court found
51. The FTCA's legislative history "[t]ime and again ...refers to the acts of regula-
tory agencies as examples of those covered by the [discretionary function] exception
.... S.A. Emprese, 104 S. Ct. at 2765.
52. 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352 (1983).
53. Id. at 657.
54. 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-408 (1982).
55. 710 F.2d at 657-58.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 85-767, 72 Stat. 885 (1958) (current version codified at 23 U.S.C.
§§ 101-157 (1982)).
59. Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (current version codified at 23 U.S.C.
§§ 401-408 (1982)).
60. 710 F.2d at 659-60.
61. Id. at 667. The plaintiffs' FTCA claim was based on the Secretary of Transporta-
tion's alleged breach of a duty imposed by the Federal Aid Highway Act. Their claim
under the Federal Highway Safety Act was based on the theory that Congress created an
implied right of action for persons injured by the government failing to follow its provi-
sions. The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim because it found that under the factors listed
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), Congress did not intend to create such a right in
passing this act.
62. 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
63. Id. at 159.
64. 710 F.2d at 664.
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the Millers' reliance on Griffin v. United States6 5 to be misplaced. In Grif-
fin, the Third Circuit stated that the discretionary function exception did
not bar a claim alleging that the Government negligently violated De-
partment of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) standards in testing
and approving a polio vaccine.6 6 The Third Circuit held that the gov-
ernment's conduct in testing the vaccine for compliance with HEW stan-
dards involved scientific evaluation rather than formation of policy.
6 7
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Griffin because the Secretary's evalua-
tion of a highway design involves a markedly different evaluation from
that used to test the purity of a drug.68
Other courts that have addressed the issue have decided that the
discretionary function exception protects the government from liability
for highway design. 69 While this decision may seem harsh or inequita-
ble, it is the role of Congress-not the courts-to modify the law to pro-
vide claimants a recovery.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Traditionally, courts have disfavored claims based on negligent in-
fliction of mental or emotional distress. 70 The Tenth Circuit's decision
in Holler v. United States7 1 reflects this disfavor. Holler brought an action
"alleging psychiatric malpractice against a doctor employed by the Vet-
erans Administration in Albuquerque, New Mexico." '7 2 Mr. Holler was a
Vietnam war veteran. In 1970 he was misdiagnosed as suffering from
"paranoid schizophrenia."' 73 In 1981 he was properly diagnosed as suf-
fering from post-traumatic stress neurosis. 74 The plaintiff sought recov-
ery for extreme emotional and mental distress caused by the negligent
misdiagnosis. 7 5 The government filed a motion to dismiss based on Mr.
Holler's failure to allege any physical injury. The district court granted
65. 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 1069.
67. Id. at 1066.
68. 710 F.2d at 664-65.
69. See, e.g., Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970) (discretionary func-
tion exception barred claim against United States for alleged unsafe and inadequate de-
sign of a traffic separator on an interstate highway); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 565
F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Ill. 1983) (decision approving a state safety program under the High-
way State Act falls within the discretionary function exception); Patton v. United States,
549 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (alleged negligent design by Army Corps of Engineers of
a government owned and operated recreation area road was within the discretionary func-
tion exception); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 893 (D. Or.
1979) (the discretionary function exception barred a claim against the government alleg-
ing that a forest service road had an unsafe design); Rayford v. United States, 410 F. Supp.
1051 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (discretionary function exception barred claim alleging that the
United States was negligent in designing, constructing, approving, and maintaining an in-
terstate highway).
70. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971).
71. 724 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1983).







Since actions under the FTCA are governed by the law of the state
where the action arose,7 7 the issue facing the Tenth Circuit was whether
New Mexico courts would find a cause of action for negligently caused
emotional distress absent physical injury. While there was no control-
ling precedent, the court of appeals decided that New Mexico courts
would find that such a cause of action did not exist in New Mexico.
The court of appeals relied on the cases of Aragon v. Speelman 78 and
Wilson v. Galt.79 In Aragon, a mother witnessed her son flying through
the air after he was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals refused to permit bystander recovery because the
mother failed to allege a physical injury. In Wilson, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals refused to allow the parents of an infant who died
from allegedly negligent medical care to recover for their emotional dis-
tress because they had not witnessed a sudden trauma involving their
child. The Tenth Circuit relied on these two cases to determine that
New Mexico followed the general rule embodied in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts Section 436A, which requires a physical injury before permit-
ting recovery for emotional distress. 80 Holler failed to allege a physical
injury, and the Tenth Circuit accordingly upheld the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint.
8 1
The underlying policy of the physical injury requirement is to re-
lieve the judicial system and potential defendants of the burden of liti-
gating claims of damages for emotional distress that are "trival,
evanescent, temporary, feigned, or imagined."'8 2 In essence, the physi-
cal injury or physical manifestation requirement serves as an "acid test"
to determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury worthy of com-
76. Id.
77. Id. See also supra note 2.
78. 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
79. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668
P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983). Aragon and Wilson are bystander cases. A bystander case is one in
which the plaintiff alleges he or she has suffered an emotional injury by being an unwilling
witness to the death or injury of another. There are three lines of authority for determin-
ing when a plaintiff is entitled to prevail on such a claim: the impact test, the zone of
danger test, and the forseeability test of Dillion v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201, 1202-3 n.3 (D.S.D.
1983) (summarizing the three tests and listing the jurisdictions which followed each at the
time of the decision). See also Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d
171 (1982).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) provides: "If the actor's conduct
is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily
harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional distur-
bance." While temporary fright, nervous shock, or nausea, even if accompanied by physi-
cal phenomena such as dizziness or vomiting, are not sufficient to establish bodily harm,
the physical injury requirement of this rule may be satisfied by long continued nausea,
headaches, or repeated attacks of hysteria. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A com-
ment c (1965). In fact, pleading and proving a physical injury or physical manifestation
may depend more on the ingenuity of counsel than on the condition of the plaintiff. See
Molien v. Kaiser Found.. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
81. 724 F.2d at 105.
82. Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982).
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pensation. Some courts have recognized that requiring the plaintiff to
establish a nebulous physical injury, such as continued nausea or head-
aches, is an unreliable and untrustworthy indicator of the validity of a
claim.
8 3
Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court, in Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,84 provided an excellent discussion of the problems
with the physical injury requirement. In Molien, a woman was negli-
gently misdiagnosed as having syphilis and was instructed by her physi-
cian to inform her husband of the purported condition. This diagnosis
directly caused the husband severe marital and emotional problems.
The plaintiff, however, alleged no physical injury. The court, after care-
ful analysis, rejected the physical injury requirement as an unreliable in-
dicator of the validity of a claim for emotional distress for three reasons.
First, the court found that the physical injury requirement is overinclu-
sive because it permits recovery for demonstrably trivial mental distress
claims accompanied by physical symptoms. Second, it is underinclusive
because serious distress is arbitrarily deemed uncompensable if not ac-
companied by physical symptoms. Third, the requirement of pleading
and proving a physical manifestation or physical injury encourages ex-
travagant pleading and distorted testimony.8 5 Justice Mosk, therefore,
determined that there was no justification for requiring allegations and
proof of some trivial physical injury to recover for extreme emotional
distress.
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's opinion is not that it imposed
the physical manifestation requirement but that it imposed the require-
ment without seriously analyzing whether it would effectively separate
meritorious claims from the trivial or fraudulent claims. In light of the
problems with the physical injury requirement, the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion at a minimum should have provided a more thorough analysis
before imposing the physical injury requirement on the plaintiff.
8 6
83. See Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980);Johnson v.
Jamacia Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 598, 467 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983), rev d on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d
523, 467 N.E.2d 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984). See also Montinieri v. Southern New Eng-
land Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 3357, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978).
84. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
85. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. See also Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio
St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983) (Ohio 1983); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermkt's, Inc., 444
A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
86. In Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983), the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court recognized the right of a bystander to recover for emotional distress.
The court, however, required the plaintiff to plead and prove a physical manifestation of
the emotional distress. This case does not necessarily mean Holler was correctly decided.
The problem with Holler is not the ultimate decision that a physical injury is required, but
the cursory analysis the court used in reaching this decision. Moreover, this result seems
to immunize psychiatrists from malpractice claims unless any emotional distress caused by
their negligence results in physical manifestations. Such a result is hardly just. Where an
actor should recognize that negligent conduct on his part may subject another to severe
emotional distress and where a duty to prevent such conduct exists, the purpose of this
duty is defeated by denying recovery merely because harm is sustained solely in the form




A. Intentional Injury Exception to the Exclusivity of Workmen's Compensation
Claims
The purpose of workmen's compensation laws is to provide assured
recovery for the injured worker without regard to fault. In return for the
certainty of payment, workmen's compensation benefits are generally
the employee's exclusive remedy against his employer for on the job
injuries. 8 7 One of the few exceptions to this exclusivity is the ability of
the employee to bring a tort claim against an employer who "intention-
ally" injures the employee.8 8 While almost all courts recognize this ex-
ception, they narrowly define the circumstances under which an injury
may be considered intentional.
8 9
In Tyner v. Fort Howard Paper Company,90 the plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action against the decedent's employer alleging that the
decedent's death was not "accidental" and, therefore, was not barred by
Oklahoma's Workmen's Compensation Act.9 1 Before his death, the de-
cedent was repairing an electrical crane. He began the repair after dis-
connecting the electrical current and padlocking the electrical control
switch. 92 A Fort Howard foreman, wishing to move the crane, removed
the padlock and activated the switch, thereby electrocuting the dece-
dent.93 The plaintiff alleged that both the foreman and the company
acted in willful and reckless disregard of the decedent's safety.
94
The district court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged facts
which would show that the injury met the "intentional" exception to
Oklahoma's Workmen's Compensation Act.9 5 Therefore, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. 96 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that willful and reck-
less conduct on the part of the employer is not sufficient to establish an
intentional injury.9 7 The court felt compelled to follow previous Tenth
Circuit case law holding that "[n]othing less than genuine intent to in-
jure is intentional for purposes of the Act."
'98
87. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.10 (1983).
88. Id. at § 68.13.
89. Id. An injury is not intentional absent an employer's genuine intent to injure a
specific employee. See Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981); Arring-
ton v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-Line Co., 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1980). "[T]he common
liability of the employer cannot be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the
gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, malicious negligence,
breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employees short of genuine intentional."
LARSON, supra note 87, at § 68.13.
90. 708 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1983).
91. OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (West Supp. 1983).
92. 708 F.2d at 518.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 519.
95. Id.
96. ld. at 518.
97. Id. at 519. The court stated that the "facts alleged, even if true, would not indicate
that Fort Howard 'intentionally' caused the death of the decedent." Id.
98. Id. at 518. (following Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir.
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The Tenth Circuit decision is consistent with authority in other ju-
risdictions.9 9 Courts and legislatures have almost uniformly limited an
employee's recovery exclusively to workmen's compensation benefits for
any employer misconduct lacking a specific intent to injure.10 0 One ex-
ception to this rule is the decision in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.' 0 1
In Mandolidis, the West Virginia Supreme Court reviewed several
cases in which the plaintiffs alleged intentional employer misconduct
that was not specifically intended to injure a given employee. In exam-
ining its state's workmen's compensation act, the court limited the gen-
eral exclusivity rule and held that the act only shielded employers from
tort liability for inadvertence or negligence. 10 2 The court stated that
willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct requires a subjective realization
of the risk of bodily injury created by the activity and, therefore, such
conduct is not accidental in any meaningful sense.10 3 The court held
that such an injury would be considered inflicted with deliberate inten-
tion for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
104
Although Mandolidis represents a distinct minority position, 10 5 it is
the better reasoned view. Mandolidis recognizes that workmen's com-
pensation statutes are designed to provide workers with a safe work-
place and an assured recovery in the event of an accident, while at the
same time protecting employers from large liability. The broad defini-
tion of the word "intentional" that was applied in Tyner results in an
employer's liability exposure which is the same whether he takes all pos-
sible safeguards to prevent injuries or whether he acts in callous disre-
gard of His employee's safety.' 0 6 Workers' Compensation Acts were
designed to improve the plight of the worker; employers were not given
the right to carry on their businesses without regard to the life or limb of
their workers and free from all common law liability. 10 7 The Mandolidis
rationale furthers this goal by deterring wilful or reckless misconduct.
A primary goal of tort law is to provide reasonable safeguards
1981) and Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-Line Co., 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir.
1980)).
99. LARSON, supra note 87, at § 68.13 n.10.1.
100. Id.
101. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), Annot. 96 A.L.R. 3d 1064 (1980).
102. 246 S.E.2d at 911-13.
103. Id. at 914.
104. Id.
105. See LARSON, supra note 87, at § 68.13 n.10.1; see, e.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milacron Chem., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (an employee may sue
an employer for intentionally exposing him to toxic chemicals even though the employer
did not have an intent to injure a specific worker).
106. See Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 11 A.D.2d 1041, 205 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1960), aff'd,
10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1961). In Santiago three employees
attempted to sue their employer under the intentional injury exception for injuries sus-
tained because the employer removed the safety guards from his equipment. The court
held that injuries incurred as a result of safety guards removed "for the sole purpose of
increasing production for greater increment and profits" were accidental within the mean-
ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 205 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
107. Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 914; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 com-
ment a (1965).
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against injury. Toward this end, the law of products liability has devel-
oped to hold manufacturers liable for selling products with "unreasona-
ble dangerous" defects, irrespective of any negligence in the
manufacturer's part.10 8 Employers, however, are not subject to civil tort
liability except for acts committed with intent to injure. Thus, employ-
ers are not fully accountable for willful, wanton and reckless conduct.
Given that reckless conduct does not subject an insured employer to
personal liability, it is not surprising that a significant number of prod-
ucts liability cases involve workers injured by their employer's ma-
chines. 10 9 It seems absurd that on one hand courts impose a very strict
standard of civil tort liability on manufacturers, in an effort to have them
design and produce safe products, while on the other hand courts per-
mit employers to set up and use those products with willful, wanton and
reckless disregard for their workers safety.1 10
B. Products Liability
Many of the diversity tort cases the Tenth Circuit addressed during
the survey period involved products liability claims. In deciding these
cases, the Tenth Circuit considered issues on the forefront of products
liability litigation.
1. Assumption of Risk
Strict products liability is not based on traditional concepts of negli-
gence and contributory negligence is not an available defense in such a
case. I I I Evidence of the plaintiffs negligent conduct is therefore irrele-
vant and inadmissible.' 12 However, assumption of risk, the voluntary
and unreasonable encounter with a known danger, is a defense in a strict
products liability action and evidence showing the plaintiff assumed a
risk in using the product is admissible.1 13 It is often difficult, however,
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
109. Of the seven cases involving a products liability claim the Tenth Circuit reviewed
during the period of this survey, six involved workplace accidents. See Hurd v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1984); Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d
657 (10th Cir. 1984); Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983); Prince v.
Leesona Corp., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983); Goodman v. Royal Indus., No. 81-2043
(10th Cir. Jul. 18, 1983) (not for routine publication); Wood v. McDonough Power Equip.
Inc., No. 82-1790 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 1983) (not for routine publication).
110. Nor can manufacturers get indemnification from employers if they are liable to an
injured worker. See, e.g., Holly Sugar Corp. v. Union Supply Co., 194 Col.. 316, 572 P.2d
148 (1977).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965). "Products liability
under § 402A does not rest upon negligence principles, but rather is premised on the
concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of com-
merce." Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976); see
also Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976); Tray-
nor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363
(1965).
112. See, e.g., Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 72, 565 P.2d 217, 220
(1977).
113. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1976); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
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to properly categorize the plaintiff's conduct as either contributory neg-
ligence or assumption of risk. The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Beacham
v. Lee-Norse 1 1 4 and Prince v. Leesona Corp' 15 illustrate this difficulty.
In Beacham, a case arising in the district court of Utah, the plaintiff's
four fingers on his right hand were severed in an industrial accident.
The fingers were severed in an unguarded "pinch point"' "1 6 of a roof
bolter. A roof bolter is a piece of mining equipment designed to pre-
vent a cave-in by bolting steel matting to the ceiling of a mine."i 7 The
design of the particular roof bolter in this case only permitted it to reach
an eight-and-one-half foot ceiling." 8 The plaintiff and the roof bolter
operator placed the roof bolter on some wood cribbing to enable it to
reach the ten-foot ceiling of the mine. The plaintiffs job required him
to stand very close to the machine in order to hold and steady the steel
mats being bolted to the ceiling. Due to the elevation of the roof bolter,
he stood on a 10" X 10" X 36" wood block in order to position the
mats. The plaintiff slipped off the block and caught his hand in the un-
guarded "pinch point."" 1 9
The trial court rejected the defendants' evidence which tended to
show that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by standing on a narrow block
near the roof bolter.120 The court also rejected evidence as to the plain-
tiff's misuse of the product by elevating it on wood cribbing. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed these rulings. 1 1 It held that the proffered evidence
showed, at most, that the plaintiff acted negligently in standing on the
narrow crib block. The court went on to hold, however, that use of the
machine was not unreasonable because his job required him to stand
near the machine and, thus, his conduct was not voluntary. 12 2 The
court suggested that if the plaintiff had reached into the pinch point to
retrieve a tool or repair the bolter that perhaps this would have raised a
jury question as to whether his conduct was voluntary and unreasona-
ble. 12 3 The court rejected the defendant's claim that elevating the roof
bolter with wood cribbing constituted misuse because there was no evi-
dence that this conduct was causally connected to the plaintiff's
injuries. 124
114. 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983).
115. 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983).
116. The pinch point refers to a point on the roof bolter where two arms of the
machine come together in a scissors-like fashion.
117. 714 F.2d at 1012-13.
118. Id. at 1012.
119. Id.
120. The court referred to the assumption of risk defense as unreasonable use. It
noted that it was doing so because the Utah Supreme Court, consistent with the concept of
comparative fault, is seeking to abolish the assumption of risk terminology. Id. at 1014
n.4.
121. Id. at 1017.
122. Id. at 1016.
123. Id. at 1015.
124. Id. When a product, safe for normal use and handling, causes an injury through
abnormal use or handling, the defendant manufacturer is not liable. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965). The manufacturer of the roof bolter at-
tempted to argue that the plaintiff was injured when the roof bolter fell off the wood crib-
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The court's analysis regarding assumption of risk or unreasonable
use is unpersuasive. The plaintiff was standing on a cribbing block three
feet high and only ten inches in diameter. The block was positioned
very close to the roof bolter. The floor of the mine was uneven and
covered with one foot of oily water. It was very likely that the plaintiff
would slip and fall into the bolter. Furthermore, the evidence suggested
he knew of the dangers posed by the roof bolter's unshielded "pinch
points". Certainly, the danger he faced of being injured by the "pinch
point" by standing next to the machine on a narrow block was at least as
great as if he was simply reaching into the bolter to retrieve a tool. The
plaintiff could have constructed a more stable platform on which to work
but, instead, voluntarily chose to use a highly unstable platform near a
dangerous machine. A jury could reasonably infer from these circum-
stances that his conduct was both voluntary and unreasonable. Thus,
the jury should have been instructed on this defense.
An interesting contrast to the Beacham decision is Prince v. Leesona
Corporation.125 In Prince the plaintiff caught her hair in a rotating shaft of
a machine. 12 6 The district court, applying Kansas law, instructed the
jury on the affirmative defense of assumption of risk.1 27 The Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld this instruction, finding that the defendant's evidence
showed that the danger was obvious and revealed that the plaintiff had
been instructed on how to wear her hair. The evidence thus raised
proper questions for the jury as to whether the plaintiff had assumed a
risk. 128
These two decisions are inconsistent. In Beacham, the plaintiffs
conduct in attempting to balance himself on a highly unstable block near
a dangerous machine did not raise a jury question as to whether the
plaintiff had voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a
known danger. In Prince, the plaintiffs conduct in improperly wearing
her hair did raise a jury question of whether she had voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger. While it is true
that Utah law applied to one case and Kansas law to the other, both
jurisdictions apply the strict liability and assumption of risk definitions
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; 129 therefore, the Tenth Circuit should
have consistently applied the assumption of the risk defense.
bing and landed on him. 714 F.2d at 1015. The Tenth Circuit held that there was no
evidence to support this argument and, thus, there was no basis for a misuse defense. Id.
125. 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 1167.
127. Id. at 1170.
128. Id.
129. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965)) (assumption of risk is avail-
able as a defense in a strict liability case); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104
(1976) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A and applying the defense of
assumption of risk as described in comment n to § 402A).
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2. Comparative Fault
In Prince v. Leesona Corp.,130 the Tenth Circuit also applied Kansas's
Comparative Negligence Act 13 1 in a products liability action. The plain-
tiff's employer, immune from suit under Kansas's workmen's compensa-
tion law, was added by the district court as a "phantom" party in order
for the jury to allocate fault among the parties.132 The jury determined
that the plaintiff suffered $200,000 in damages, for which she was thirty-
five percent responsible, her employer was sixty percent responsible,
and the Leesona Corporation was five percent responsible. Since the
Leesona Corporation could only be held liable to the extent of its fault,
the plaintiff was awarded $10,000.133
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the jury instructions which al-
lowed the jury to consider the ordinary negligence of her employer in
assessing fault. 134 The Tenth Circuit, while noting that traditional no-
tions of strict liability and negligence are analytically difficult to harmo-
nize, held that under Kansas law ajury is permitted to consider all types
of fault, even ordinary contributory negligence, to determine the degree
of an actor's responsibility for causing the injury. 13 5 The court con-
cluded that the instruction based on contributory negligence was not
reversible error.'
36
The court's holding in Prince reflects one of the ambiguities that is
at the heart of comparative fault: whether conduct which amounts to
assumption of risk or misuse of a product can be used to offset a judg-
ment or whether any conduct, including contributory negligence, can be
used to offset a judgment. 13 7 The Tenth Circuit noted its previous
holding in Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 13 8 that reversible error
does not result from only basing jury instructions on the concepts of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 13 9 In Prince, the Tenth
Circuit held that it is not reversible error to base an instruction on con-
tributory negligence. The problem with the Prince opinion is that it
avoided the issue squarely before the court: when should ajury be per-
mitted to consider ordinary contributory negligence in determining the
comparative fault of the actors in a strict products liability case?
130. 720 F.2d 1166.
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-258a (1976). See Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439,
460, 618 P.2d 788, 803 (1980) (comparative negligence principles are applicable in strict
liability cases).
132. 720 F.2d at 1167. Kansas comparative fault law allows defendants to force a com-
parison of fault with third parties even though the third parties cannot be held legally
responsible. See Albertson v. Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 230 Kan. 368, 374, 634
P.2d 1127, 1132 (1981). The Tenth Circuit referred to such parties as "phantom" parties.
133. 720 F.2d at 1167-68.
134. Id. at 1170-71.
135. Id. at 1171.
136. Id.
137. See V. SCHWARTZ., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 12.2 (1974).
138. 691 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1982).




In Saupitty v. Yazoo Manufacturing Co., 14 0 the plaintiff, in the course
of his employment, rode the lawnmower down a hill when the mower
began bouncing and shaking. 14 1 The plaintiffs employer stripped a
mower of its throttle control, brakes and belt guard. When the plaintiff
attempted to slow the mower by placing the machine into reverse gear,
the mower bucked the plaintiff over the top of the machine, and severed
his thumb and two fingers.
142
The plaintiff contended that the mower blades, rather than one of
the unguarded belts, mangled his hand and that numerous design de-
fects in the mower made it likely that he would be thrown from the
machine. 143 The defendant argued that the removal of the mower's
throttle control, brakes, and belt guard amounted to a superseding, in-
tervening cause which negated the manufacturer's liability. 14 4 The jury
found for the plaintiff and awarded $560,000 in compensatory damages
and $440,000 in punitive damages. 14 5 The Tenth Circuit, applying
Oklahoma law, affirmed this award stating that the plaintiff produced
sufficient evidence to justify submitted the issue of punitive damages to
the jury. 14 6 The Tenth Circuit relied on the case of Thiry v. Armstrong
World Industries,14 7 in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
Punitive damages may be assessed against the manufacturer of
a product injuring the plaintiff if the injury is attributable to
conduct that reflects reckless disregard for public safety. 'Reckless
disregard' is not to be confused with inadvertent conduct. To
meet this standard the manufacturer must either be aware of,
or culpably indifferent to, an unnecessary risk of injury.
148
The import of Thiry is that it permits manufacturers to be held liable
for punitive damage only when their conduct in designing or manufac-
turing a product is so egregious as to warrant sanction. Specifically,
Thiry carefully limited punitive awards in products liability actions to
cases where reckless disregard is established.
Strict liability in tort focuses on the nature of the product rather
than the conduct of the manufacturer. 149 Therefore, proof which sim-
ply establishes strict liability is not sufficient to justify an award of puni-
tive damages. In Saupitty, however, the court failed to indicate what
facts, if any, were established at trial to justify the award of punitive
damages. The court merely asserted that the "plaintiff produced suffi-
cient evidence of manufacturer's reckless disregard for public safety to
140. 726 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1984).
141. Id. at 658-59.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 659-60.
145. Id. at 658.
146. Id. at 659.
147. 661 P.2d 515 (Okla. 1983).
148. Id. at 518 (emphasis in original, footnote containing citations olniled).
149. See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY, § I6A13 1 (1984).
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justify submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury."' 150 With-
out a discussion of facts which justify the imposition of punitive dam-
ages, Saupitty suggests that proof of a defect alone is sufficient to raise a
jury question on the issue of punitive damages, rendering manufacturers
potentially liable for punitive damage without any proof of misconduct
on their part. Judge Seth, in his dissent, asserted that the evidence did
not support an award of punitive damages. 15 1 In sum, it appears that
the majority simply affirmed the award of punitive damages without re-
ally examining whether the evidence justified such an award.
In Averitt v. Southland Motor Inn,15 2 Averitt contracted shigella after
eating at the restaurant in Southland's hotel.' 53 Averitt sued on theo-
ries of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, alleging that
the defendants sold him food contaminated with shigella. 15 4 Southland
appealed, inter alia, the award of punitive damages.
155
The court stated that Averitt's evidence, which showed that South-
land had repeatedly violated health department regulations by permit-
ting unsanitary conditions to exist in the restaurant and by failing to
notify its guests that they had been exposed to shigella, justified an
award of punitive damages. 156 These facts reflect the factors that the
court in Thiry stated should be considered in a products case.
The award of punitive damages is an award to the plaintiff in excess
of compensatory or nominal damages to punish the defendant's aggra-
vated misconduct. 15 7 Courts should take care to demonstrate that the
award is justified. In Averitt, the court's discussion of the factual basis for
punitive damages demonstrates that such care was taken and that the
judgment was not merely affirmed without any factual support in the
record. The court's decision in Saupitty, however, fails to demonstrate
similar well-reasoned decisionmaking.
James A. Gouwar
150. 726 F.2d at 660. This is the standard the Oklahoma Supreme Court set forth in
Thiry, 661 P.2d at 518, for determining when an award of punitive damages is justified.
151. 726 F.2d at 661 (Judge Seth dissenting).
152. 720 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1983).
153. Shigella is a genus of bacteria that causes infection or dysentery.
154. Id. at 1180.
155. Id. at 1182. Although the defendants attempted to attack the entire judgment, the
court prevented the defendants from doing so because the defendants' notice of appeal
only challenged the district court's decision "insofar as that judgment relates to punitive
damages." Id. at 1180-81 (quoting defendants notice of appeal). See FED. R. App. PRO.
3(c); Perington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369, 1379 (10th Cir.
1979) (an appellate court has jurisdiction to review only the part of the judgment desig-
nated in the notice of appeal).
156. Id. at 1183.
157. See generatty D. DOBBs, HANDIBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 204-21 (1973).
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